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Abstract
A number of low- and middle-income countries have a severe short-
age of health workers. This paper studies how health workers’ choices
of labour supply and work eﬀo r ti m p a c to nt h eq u a l i t yo fh e a l t hs e r -
vices when health workers are in short supply. We analyse how pol-
icy measures such as monetary incentives, monitoring, provisions of
quality-enhancing inputs, and the building of professionalism and or-
ganisational identity can improve the quality of health care in the pres-
ence of a health worker shortage. We ﬁnd that to pay health workers
based on the number of patients may have a positive impact on the
q u a l i t yo fh e a l t hc a r ee v e ni fq u a l i t yd o e sn o ta ﬀect demand. Further-
more, provision of quality-enhancing drugs and equipment may reduce
health workers’ eﬀort in delivering quality care, thus diminishing the
positive impact of such interventions. Our most surprising result is
that if the actual quality of health care is far below a professional stan-
dard, measures to build a professional mindset among health workers
may reduce the quality of care.
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11 Introduction
Inadequate health worker performance is a widespread problem in many low
and middle income countries (Rowe et al., 2005). Poor performance, such as
weak compliance with clinical guidelines, is a threat to population health in
these countries, not only because low quality health services may be harmful
to the patients, but also because poor quality will reduce the utilisation of
health services in general.
The reasons for inadequate health worker performance are poorly under-
stood. Historically, much attention has focussed on the lack of suﬃcient
knowledge and skills in the health workforce. Recent evidence suggests,
however, that many health workers provide services with a quality level sig-
niﬁcantly below that of which they are capable, given their actual level of
knowledge and the physical infrastructure they have at their disposal (Das
and Hammer, 2007; Leonard et al., 2007). The existence of such a know-do
gap suggests that more training is not the only, and perhaps not the best,
way of improving health worker performance.
One fact which might explain both a low absolute level of performance
and a know-do gap is the severe shortage of health workers in many low
income countries (Barber et al., 2007). The problem is particularly acute in
Sub-Saharan Africa, which has 24 percent of the global burden of disease but
only 3 percent of the health workforce (WHO, 2006). If health workers are too
f e w ,t h e ym a ys i m p l yn o th a v es u ﬃcient time to provide services of adequate
quality. The current health worker shortage calls for a reassessment of policies
for improving the quality of health services in low income countries. To this
end, we develop a model to analyse how health worker performance and the
quality of health services are aﬀected by the shortage of health personnel,
and how quality can be improved in such a setting.
One important issue is how an increased supply of drugs, equipment and
other ”performance-enabling factors” impacts on the quality of health ser-
vices when health workers are time-constrained at the outset. Better drug
supply, for instance, may attract a higher number of patients to the health
facilities and thus increase the workload. Health workers may then be forced
to spend even less time with each patient, which is likely to reduce quality.
Such behavioural responses to increased supply of equipment and drugs are
not well understood. The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is to explore possi-
ble linkages between the supply of ”performance-enablers” and health worker
behaviour in a situation with a health worker shortage.
2If low quality is a consequence of a health worker shortage, a natural
policy response is to train and recruit more health workers. While it is
certainly important to increase the number of health workers, other policy
options also seem available. Recent studies from several low income countries
have found high rates of absenteeism in health facilities, up to 40% in some
areas (Chaudhury et al., 2006; Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2006). If low health
worker performance is caused partly by an excessive workload, quality may
improve if absenteeism is reduced. Hence, policies which primarily aim at
reducing absenteeism might deserve a place among the tools that can be used
for improving health service quality. The second contribution of this paper
is to examine how labour supply decisions and labour supply policies aﬀect
the quality of health services in the presence of a health worker shortage.
A high workload is unlikely to be the only explanation for the observed
know-do gap. Recent literature suggests that motivational problems also play
a crucial role in explaining low levels of performance (Leonard et al., 2007;
Das and Hammer, 2007). Motivational problems can partly be ascribed to
lack of economic incentives or the lack of other extrinsic sources of motiva-
tion, such as unclear career paths and unpredictable patterns of promotion
(Manongi et al., 2006). Others have emphasised that the internal motivation
or vocation of health workers is under stress in many low income countries
(WHO, 2006). In focus group discussions that we conducted with Tanzanian
health workers, many participants pointed both at lack of monetary rewards
and a decline in the sense of vocation as important reasons for sub-standard
performance.
Performance-based pay has recently been advocated as a promising tool
for improved health system performance in low income countries (Meessen
et al., 2006; NORAD, 2007). Performance-based pay can be seen as a way to
address the problems caused by low extrinsic and intrinsic motivation among
health workers. In practice, performance-based pay in low income countries
boils down to some kind of output-related reward (e.g., a reward related to
the number of patients). At ﬁrst glance, output-based pay may seem quite
misplaced in health systems which are severely capacity constrained by a
shortage of health workers. However, since capacity limits are not necessarily
absolute, not even in the short run (e.g., due to high levels of absenteeism),
the scope for output-based pay might be larger than it seems at the outset.
The third contribution of this paper is to investigate the potential role of
output-based pay for the quality of services in a setting with both a health
worker shortage and endogenous labour supply. This represents an extension
3of the work by Ma (1994) who discusses the impact of output-based ﬁnancing
on the quality of health care when labour supply is exogenous.
Monetary incentives are not the only way of addressing motivational prob-
lems. Nor are they an ideal measure, as the quality of health services will
often be extremely costly to observe and verify on a regular basis. There-
fore, much emphasis has traditionally been placed on building professional
attitudes among health workers. This can be seen as an attempt to make
the pursuit of certain quality standards part of the intrinsic motivation of
the health workers (i.e., to make the health workers willing to incur personal
costs in order to adhere to the quality standards even if deviation is non-
observable). While the possibilities to change workers’ objectives have been
discussed within sociology for decades (Barnard, 1938; Selznick, 1957) and
are an important part of current management theories, these options have
been almost neglected within the economics literature. Health worker be-
haviour in the presence of professionalism has been discussed by Woodward
and Warren-Boulton (1984) and Gaynor et al. (2004), among others, but
in these papers, the strength of professional attitudes is taken as exogenous
parameters. Our fourth contribution is to introduce the possibility that the
degree of professionalism might be inﬂuenced by policy makers. We show,
somewhat surprisingly, that a strengthening of professional attitudes might
reduce the quality of health services when quality at the outset falls far short
of the professional standard.
The usual way of modelling professional attitudes among health workers
is to assume that their utility is reduced when actual performance diﬀers from
some ideal level of performance. This modelling may not capture very well
the attitude of genuine patient care, which has also received much attention
in the medical profession, such as, for instance, in the Hippocractic Oath. To
care for the patients, or to maximise the health of the population, could be
seen as the ultimate goal of the health sector, and thus as the ”organisational
goal” of any health care institution. Following Akerlof and Kranton (2005),
one way of addressing motivational problems in organisations is to build an
”organisational identity”, i.e., to align the goals of individual workers with
the goal of their organisation. We argue that a natural operationalisation
of the concept of organisational identity in the health sector, or genuine
patient care, might diﬀer from the concept of professionalism. Our ﬁfth
contribution is to explore how the impacts on the quality of health services
of a stronger organisational identity might diﬀer from the eﬀects of stronger
professionalism.
42 Health worker motivation, behaviour and
the quality of health services
This section develops an analytical framework that can be used to examine
policy options for improving the quality of health services when health work-
ers are in short supply and the rate of absenteeism in health facilities may
be large. The analytical framework highlights the importance of individual
health workers’ choices for the quality of health services. We start by formal-
ising how the quality of health services is aﬀected by the level of eﬀort that
health workers put into the production of health services and by their labour
supply. Thereafter, we specify the motivational factors which, together with
the incentive structure facing the health workers, explain their behaviour.
2.1 Determinants of health service quality
When health workers are in short supply, both their choice of work eﬀort
and work hours may have an impact on the quality of the health services.
We deﬁne eﬀort as any activity that improves the clinical quality of the
services, including thorough history-taking and physical examination, but
also activities that increase the patient’s feeling of convenience, comfort and
education about medical conditions (see Wedig et al., 1989). The quality of
health services is also inﬂuenced by a number of factors beyond the control of
the individual health worker, such as the supply of equipment and drugs, the
quality of their education etc. Variable x denotes these external factors, e is
the level of eﬀort, and q represents the quality of health care. The quality of
health services can then be written as q = q(e,x). We assume that quality
is non-decreasing in both e and x (i.e., qe(e,x) ≥ 0,q x(e,x) ≥ 0).
Proper history taking, examination, and medication of patients are time
consuming. Following Ma and McGuire (1997), we therefore assume that
the level of eﬀort e per patient is equivalent to the time spent with each
patient. Accordingly, we assume that there exists a minimum level of eﬀort
e such that e ≥ e > 0. T h em a x i m u mt i m et h a tc a nb es p e n to ne a c h
patient is equal to the number of hours l that the health worker spends at
the health facility divided by the number of patients n. The level of eﬀort is
thus bounded from above by the constraint e ≤ l/n. In the following, health
worker shortage is deﬁned as the case when this constraint is binding, i.e.,
when e = l/n. Hence, when there is a health worker shortage, because there
5are few health workers and/or because those who are there are often absent
from work, there will be a direct association between the health workers’
supply of labour and their eﬀort levels, and thus between labour supply and
the quality of health services.
The association between labour supply on the one hand and the level
of eﬀort/quality on the other is somewhat more involved than suggested so
far, because the number of patients n may increase with the quality of the
health services. Following McGuire (2000), we assume that the number of
patients is a function of the net beneﬁts they receive from health services.
We formalise net beneﬁts as the diﬀerence between the quality q and the user
fee p. Hence, the number of patients will be
n = n(q(e,x) − p).
In the case of a health worker shortage, the constrained level of eﬀort ˆ e is
then implicitly deﬁned by the relationship
ˆ e =
l
n(q(ˆ e,x) − p)
. (1)
We assume that the user fee is unresponsive to the number of patients, as
user fees in many low income countries are deﬁned by government authorities
and do not normally serve the role as a market clearing device. The relation-













n is the elasticity of the number of patients with respect
to the level of eﬀort. Eﬀort (and hence the quality of health services) is
monotonically increasing in labour supply. But the higher the number of
patients, the smaller will be the gain in eﬀort for a given increase in hours
worked, because the increased amount of available time has to be shared
across a larger number of patients. Thus, with a positive demand response
(i.e., ∂n/∂q > 0), the eﬀort level will tend to be a concave function of labour
supply.1
1In theory, the function ˆ e(l) may also have non-concave segments, for instance if the
demand response is non-continuous in the sense that there is level of eﬀort ˜ e such that
∂n/∂e >> 0 for e<˜ e, while ∂n/∂e =0for e ≥ ˜ e.
62.2 Health worker motivation
In health economics, as in economics more generally, it is still common to
assume that work behaviour is driven solely by narrow self-interest.2 It is
o f t e na c k n o w l e d g e dt h a tm a n yh e a l t hw o r k e r s ’m o t i v a t i o ne x t e n d sb e y o n d
their narrow self-interests, but these motivations are seldom explicitly mod-
elled, and there is little agreement about how it should be done (McGuire,
2000). One possibility is to model other-regarding concerns as a constraint on
behaviour. Ma and McGuire (1997) follow this line when they assume that
physicians must provide health beneﬁts above a certain threshold. Another
alternative is to assume that health personnel make trade-oﬀs between selﬁsh
and other-regarding concerns, as in Woodward and Warren-Bolton (1984).
We follow the latter approach by assuming that a health worker trades oﬀ
her narrow self-interests against two kinds of other-regarding concerns that
seem to be of particular relevance in the health sector; professionalism and
organisational identity. We start by modelling the health worker’s narrow
self-interests.
Self-interest The health worker in our model enjoys income from the fa-
cility but ﬁnds it unpleasant to exert eﬀort above some critical level. She
also takes account of how the time spent at the facility prevents her from
pursuing other activities. To be more speciﬁc, the health worker allocates a
ﬁxed time endowment ¯ l between health services production and other activ-
ities (e.g., other work or leisure). Time spent in health service production
generates an income I and some personal eﬀort costs c(·).T i m e s p e n t o n
other activities (¯ l−l) generates a constant beneﬁt z per unit of time. Income
from health service production consists of a ﬁxed salary w and maybe also an
output-based salary component related to the number of patients seen. The
output-based component can for instance be calculated as a share of the user
fees charges, or it can be an output-bonus paid for by the employer without
any relation to the user fees. Let φ denote the additional pay per patient.
Income is then I = w + φn.
We allow for the possibility that the discovery of illegitimate absenteeism
may trigger some kind of sanctions. Sanctions may result in reduced future
2This practice takes place despite a fast growing heap of evidence that individual behav-
iour is swayed by other-regarding motivations; see Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for labaratory
experiments on social behaviour and other-regarding preferences, and Rotemberg (2006)
for a discussion of social motivation at workplaces.
7income opportunities, for instance through less promotions or even through
a termination of the work relation. Proper modelling of such sanctions would
call for a multi-period model, but we limit ourselves to a reduced form spec-
iﬁcation by assuming that income is received with a probability π(l) ≤ 1. π
is increasing in l as long as there is illegitimate absenteeism. π equals one if
there is no illegitimate absenteeism.3
Personal eﬀort costs c(·) are increasing (c0 > 0) and convex (c00 > 0) in
the aggregate eﬀo r te x e r t e dp e rw o r k i n gd a y ,w h i c hi se q u a lt ot h ee ﬀort per
patient multiplied by the number of patients seen.
If we let S capture the health worker’s narrow self-interests, we can now
write;
S ≡ π(l)I(e) − c(ne)+z(¯ l − l). (3)
Professionalism One relevant motivation extending self-interest is a pref-
erence for adhering to a professional standard. We model a health worker’s
professional attitude as a loss in utility whenever actual quality q deviates
from some “ideal” level of quality qN.W ei n t e r p r e tqN as reﬂecting clinical
guidelines or some other medical standard. Following Gaynor et al. (2004),
we further assume that the utility loss is higher the larger the number of
patients treated at sub-standard quality levels. A simple way of capturing





We will assume throughout that q<q N.
Organisational identity (or altruism) A professional attitude geared
at achieving some medical standard does not necessarily fully capture a mo-
tivation to care for the well-being of the patients. For instance, a health
worker with a professional attitude as speciﬁed in Eq. (4) would experience
a loss in utility whenever the number of patients increases (as long as q diﬀers
from qN). This speciﬁcation certainly has some merit, but it fails to capture
the fact that many health workers would also experience some kind of utility
3π can also be a function of the level of eﬀort in case there is a probability that
unacceptable low eﬀorts will be discovered and sanctioned. The level of eﬀort is however
far more diﬃcult to observe and verify on a routine basis than the level of absenteeism.
8gain by treating a larger number of patients. Such altruistic attitudes to-
wards the patients, which have been strongly promoted in the health sector,
would require a diﬀerent speciﬁcation.
T h ed e g r e eo fa l t r u i s mt o w a r d sp a t i e n t sc a nb ev i e w e da sap e r s o n a lt r a i t
which is more or less unchangeable. In our opinion this interpretation is too
narrow. Following Akerlof and Kranton (2005), we believe that it is possible
to develop behaviours which are consistent with altruism by strengthening
the health workers’ “organisational identity”, i.e., the degree to which they
adopt the goals of the health care sector as their own goals. A central goal of
any health care institution is to improve patient welfare. Building organisa-
tional identity in the health sector would therefore likely make health workers
behave more altruistically. In fact, we believe that organisational identity is
easier to sustain in the health sector and other “idealistic” organisations than
in many other businesses.
In our set-up, the objective of the health sector O is to improve patient
welfare, as represented by the number of patients treated times the average
quality of the treatment;
O ≡ nq
In sum, then, we portray a health worker who varies her work hours and
work eﬀort so as to maximise
U (l,e)=S (l,e)+αO(l,e)+γP (l,e),
where α and γ represent the degree of organisational identity (and/or altru-
ism towards patients) and the degree of professionalism.
Julian Le Grand (2003) has presented a motivational dichotomy for pro-
fessional workers where he distinguishes between knights and knaves. Knights
are honourably committed to deliver high quality services to the public they
serve, while knaves are selﬁsh and care only about their personal gains. In
our model, a knave would be characterised by α = γ =0. Such a person
will be denoted a selﬁsh health worker. Our model has no true knights, but
we have health workers who trade oﬀ their narrow self-interest against pro-
fessional attitudes and/or organisational goals (i.e., α and/or γ are greater
than zero). Such a person will be denoted an ethical health worker.
92.3 Choices: The selﬁsh health worker
As e l ﬁsh health worker chooses her labour supply and eﬀort to maximise
U(l,e)=[ w + φn(e)]π(l) − c(ne)+z(¯ l − l)
subject to the constraints
l ≤ ¯ l




2.3.1 No health worker shortage
It is instructive to start with the case without a health worker shortage, i.e.,
when e ≤ l/n is non-binding, implying that e can be chosen independently of
l. Assuming an interior solution, the ﬁrst order conditions for optimal choice




















The working time allocated to health service production is decided by
equalising the marginal increase in expected income (through a reduction
in the probability of sanctions related to illegitimate absenteeism) with the
marginal beneﬁts z from alternative activities.
The level of eﬀort is decided by equalising the marginal increase in in-
comes from higher eﬀorts with the marginal increase in eﬀort costs. Income
is increasing in eﬀort if there is a demand response (∂n/∂e > 0) and if income
is linked to the number of patients (φ>0).E ﬀort costs are increasing in
the level of eﬀorts both because it is personally costly to treat each patient
more carefully and because the health worker must treat more patients as
higher quality causes an increase in the number of patients n. If there is no
output-based income (φ =0 ) , the selﬁsh health worker chooses the minimum
level of eﬀort e.
With no health worker shortage, it is unlikely that there will be any
association between labour supply and the quality of health services, even
10though l appears in Eq. (6). Since there is no shortage, health workers
will spend some of their working time just waiting without attending any
patients. With excess labour supply it seems unlikely that a small reduction
in l will aﬀect the likelihood of sanctions being imposed due to illegitimate
absenteeism. Hence, π can be treated as a constant, and e will be independent
of l.
2.3.2 Health worker shortage
We have deﬁned a health worker shortage as the situation where the level
of eﬀort exerted per patient is eﬀectively constrained by the condition e ≤
l/n. That is, a shortage exists when, at the actual level of labour supply,
t h eh e a l t hw o r k e r sd on o th a v es u ﬃc i e n tt i m et oe x e r tt h el e v e lo fe ﬀort
that they would have chosen if labour were in more abundant supply. This
deﬁnition, by taking into account the labour supply decision of the existing
workforce, represents a more compelling operationalisation of the concept of a
health worker shortage than the standard approach of simply focusing on the
number of health workers relative to some predeﬁned standard. In particular,
this operationalisation takes into account the important role of high rates of
absenteeism in understanding the degree of health worker shortages in several
low income countries. At the same time, it points to the fact that with
high rates of absenteeism, health worker shortages may be at least partly
addressed through increased labour supply from the existing workforce.
The health worker’s utility in the case of a health worker shortage is
deﬁned as
U(l)=[ w + φn(ˆ e(l))]π(l) − c(l)+z(¯ l − l)














The marginal beneﬁts of increased labour supply consist in this case not
only of the increase in expected income due to reduced absenteeism, but
also of the higher incomes that may be generated through a positive demand
response when the level of eﬀort and the quality of services increase. The
marginal costs of increased labour supply now include not only the marginal
11value of other activities z, but also the marginal costs of increased eﬀort
levels c0.
Despite the increase in both marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs of
labour supply, it is straightforward to demonstrate that a health worker
shortage will cause an increase in the labour supply, i.e., ˆ l>l ∗. The level of
eﬀort per patient will decline, i.e., ˆ e<e ∗.4














4This follows from the fact that l∗ and e∗ solve the ﬁrst order condition for an interior
optimum, which means that the ﬁrst order eﬀect of a small adjustment in l and e away
from l∗ and e∗ is zero. Hence, the health worker will adjust both variables in order to
satisfy the constraint imposed by the health worker shortage.
Formally, the result can be shown by the ﬁrst order condition, which can be written
as I ∂π
∂l − z +
£
φ∂n
∂ˆ eπ(l) − c0 £∂n
∂ˆ e ˆ e + n
¤¤ dˆ e
dl.A s s u m et h a tˆ e<e ∗. Then, the term in square
brackets, which is the ﬁrst order condition for e∗ in the unconstrained case, is bound to
be postive. Since dˆ e/dl is positive as well, the sum of the two ﬁrst terms, which is the ﬁrst
order condition for l∗ in the unconstrained case, must be negative, implying that ˆ l>l ∗.
B yt h es a m ea r g u m e n t ,ˆ e>e ∗ would imply ˆ l<l ∗, which is an impossibility given the
constraint imposed by the health worker shortage. Hence, ˆ e<e ∗ and ˆ l>l ∗.
12Whenever (e∗,l ∗)l i e sa b o v et h eˆ e(l) curve, there will be a health worker
shortage. The health workers will then choose the point at the ˆ e(l) curve
which maximises their level of utility, represented by the indiﬀerence countors
circling around the unconstrained optimum (e∗,l ∗).
2.4 Choices: The ethical health worker
Let us now introduce a health worker who is motivated not only by nar-
row self-interest, but also by professionalism and/or a desire to deliver high
quality health services to many patients (i.e., organisational identity or al-
truism). In this section, we conﬁne the discussion to the case with a shortage
of health workers. Health workers then choose their working time l in order
to maximise their utility
U(l)=S(l,ˆ e(l)) + αn(ˆ e(l))q(ˆ e(l)) − γn(ˆ e(l))
£
q
N − q(ˆ e(l))
¤
where S(·) captures all the narrowly self-interested concerns discussed above.


































The ﬁrst term captures how a small increase in working time aﬀects self-
interested concerns, as discussed above. The second term captures the in-
crease in utility that comes from the fact that an increase in time spent at
t h ec l i n i cb o t hi n c r e a s e st h en u m b e ro fp a t i e n t st r e a t e da n dt h eq u a l i t yo f
the service. The last term captures how spending more time at the clinic af-
fects the costs of deviating from a professional standard. This term includes
both a positive and a negative component. More time spent at the clinic
has a positive eﬀect on utility since it increases eﬀort per patient and thus
brings the quality closer to the professional norm. But higher quality also
attracts more patients to the facility, which implies a utility loss whenever
the treatment does not satisfy the professional standards (i.e., when q<q N).












where εn,q is the elasticity of the number of patients with respect to the level
of quality.
13O n ei m p o r t a n to b s e r v a t i o nf r o mE q . ( 9 )i st h a ti ti sn o to b v i o u st h a t
an ethical health worker will work more and exert higher eﬀorts per patient
than a health worker who is concerned solely with her narrow self-interest.
The optimal levels of l and e will be higher only if




This condition is satisﬁed as long as the actual quality of health services q
is not too diﬀerent form the professional norm qN. Hence, in those cases where
the actual performance does not deviate much form professional standards
we can expect that the ethical health worker will work more and exert higher
eﬀorts than the selﬁsh health worker. However, if the actual quality falls far
below the professional norm, a health worker which experience a large loss
in utility by treating patients in a sub-standard way may actually choose
to work less and thus exert less eﬀort than the selﬁsh health worker. The
reason is that the number of patients receiving inadequate treatment will
decline when her working time is reduced. In other words, if it is impossible
to achieve more than an extremely low quality of service, the professional
health worker may rather choose to stay away.
It is straightforward to show that if there is no shortage of health workers,
the ethical health worker would choose the same working time l as the selﬁsh
health worker, simply because the choice of l has no eﬀect neither on the
number of patients treated nor on the quality of the service. Whether or not
the ethical health worker would exert higher eﬀo r t sw o u l dd e p e n do ne x a c t l y
the same factors as in the case of a health worker shortage (see (10)).
3 Alternative ways of improving the quality
of health services
We will use our framework to analyse how diﬀerent policy measures will
aﬀect health worker behaviour and the quality of health services. The policy
instruments we consider fall into three categories. First, there are policies
directed at increasing the supply of various ”performance enabling factors”,
such as the supply of equipment and drugs, the level of knowledge and skills,
etc. Second, there are policies which aﬀect monetary incentives and the
degree of monitoring and control. The third group of policy instruments is
14those which attempt to change the health workers’ motivational structures,
such as the degree of professionalism and/or organisational identity.
3.1 Performance enabling factors
The traditional approach to improving the quality of health services in low
income countries has focussed much on the insuﬃcient supply of various
performance enabling factors (e.g., drugs, equipment, knowledge and skills).
In our model, these factors are captured by the parameter x, and they are
assumed to have a direct positive impact on the quality of health services.
One often neglected aspect in discussions of the impact of performance
enabling factors, is their potential indirect eﬀects through changes in health
worker behaviour (and even in their motivation). Our analytical framework
allows us to study how an increase in x may aﬀect the health workers’ supply
of labour l and level of eﬀort e. Obviously, if there are both a shortage of
health workers and a positive demand response, the ﬁrst order eﬀect of an
increase in x is to reduce the time available per patient and thus reduce the
level of e (see Eq. (1)). In other words, there will be a crowding-out of the
quality of the services through reduced eﬀort per patient. However, if the
labour supply also increases when x increases, the crowding-out eﬀect will
diminish and might perhaps disappear. It is therefore of great interest to
discuss how labour supply might respond to an increase in x.
In general, the eﬀect of x on ˆ l can be found as dˆ l/dx = −Ulx(ˆ l)/Ull(ˆ l),
where Uij ≡ ∂2U/∂i∂j. By the second order condition, Ull(ˆ l) < 0. The sign
of dˆ l/dx thus equals the sign of Ulx(ˆ l).
Consider the case of a selﬁsh health worker in the presence of a health
worker shortage. Ul(ˆ l) is then given by Eq. (7), implying that the sign of

























There are three ways in which changes in x may aﬀect the labour supply
(and thus the eﬀort per patient) of a selﬁsh health worker. First, with higher
x and a positive demand response, the number of patients will increase.
This will increase health worker income if income is positively related to the
number of patients, and it will therefore weaken the incentives for illegitimate
absenteeism and stimulate labour supply (provided ∂π/∂l > 0). Second, the
15level of x may aﬀect the ”eﬀectiveness” of eﬀort in producing quality services.
For instance, if x and e are complements (i.e., ∂2n/∂e∂x > 0), an increase
in x might strengthen the incentives for work because higher eﬀort now has
a stronger impact on quality and thus on the number of patients. Third, an
increase in x will aﬀect the slope of the ˆ e(l) curve, i.e., the marginal rate of
transformation of labour supply into eﬀort per patient. The ﬁrst order eﬀect
is a reduction in the slope of the ˆ e(l) curve, as a higher number of patients
will reduce the attainable level of ˆ e for a given supply of labour. A reduction
in the slope the of ˆ e(l) curve pulls towards a reduction in labour supply, as a
marginal increase in labour supply will have a smaller impact on eﬀort and
hence on the number of patients.
Note that all these three mechanisms will impact on labour supply only
if the utility of the health worker is a positive function of the number of
patients. For a selﬁsh health worker, therefore, x will impact on labour
supply only if there is an output-bonus (φ>0). As can be seen from Eq.
(11), dˆ l/dx =0if φ =0 . A positive demand response in the wake of an
increase in x will then translate directly into a reduction in the eﬀort per
patient.
In general, the eﬀect of x on labour supply ˆ l is ambiguous. Consider an
example where n = q − p, q = κe + v(x),p=0 , and π =1in the relevant






























which clearly can be either positive or negative. Figure 2 below illustrates
how an increase in x might lead to a reduction in the optimal labour supply
in the case of a health worker shortage and thus reinforce the crowding-out
of eﬀort per patient. The increase in x tilts the ˆ e(l) curve downwards. The
increase in the number of patients combined with a substitution eﬀect pulling
towards a lower level of ˆ l implies that labour supply and eﬀo r td e c l i n ef r o m
(ˆ l0, ˆ e0) to (ˆ l1, ˆ e1).
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Figure 2: Higher x may cause a reduction in b l.
For the ethical health worker, an increase in x will produce additional both
positive and negative eﬀects on the marginal beneﬁts of increased labour
supply. For instance, a higher level of q and n will have a direct positive
impact on the marginal beneﬁts of labour supply both for the professional
health worker and for the health worker with a strong organisational identity
(see Eq. (8)). But there are also other mechanisms at work. A decline in the
slope of the ˆ e(l) curve, for instance, will pull in the opposite direction.
Finally, note that a negative eﬀect of x on eﬀort e is not unlikely even
without a health worker shortage. In that case, all factors which contribute
to a higher number of patients will increase the marginal eﬀort costs (see
the last term in Eq. (6)). A positive eﬀect on e is however also conceivable,
provided there are complementarities between e and x so that ∂2n/∂e∂x is
positive.
173.2 Monetary incentives and monitoring
It is often prohibitively costly for relevant principals to observe and verify the
quality of the health services on a regular basis. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to
design eﬀective incentive mechanisms to improve the quality of the services.
However, as argued by Ma (1994) and others, if improved quality generates a
positive demand response, quality levels may be improved by letting health
workers’ income increase with the number of patients, i.e., through output-
based ﬁnancing.
In our model, output-based ﬁnancing is implemented when φ>0. With
no shortage of health workers, it is easily seen from Eq. (6) that a higher
output-bonus will translate into higher eﬀorts per patient and thus into higher
quality of the health services, which is a direct parallel to the results of Ma
(1994).
Obviously, this result no longer holds if there is a health worker short-
age and labour supply is exogenous, as it will be if the existing workforce
spends all available time in the production of health services (i.e., l = ¯ l).
Output-based pay (φ>0) will then only increase the salary of the health
workers and not change their behaviours. This is a trivial result, but it
nevertheless deserves some attention at a time when aid donors are push-
ing for performance-based pay in health sectors which appear to be capacity
constrained through a low number of health workers.
However, in health systems with both a health worker shortage and high
rates of absenteeism, there may still be a rationale for implementing output-
based ﬁnancing. In this case, an increase in φ will induce health workers to
spend more time at their working stations, because health service production
becomes more valuable compared to alternative activities (see Eq. (7)). The
health worker will then have more time per patient, which will enable her
to exert a level of eﬀo r tp e rp a t i e n tc l o s e rt oh e rﬁrst-best (unconstrained)
eﬀort level e∗. Quality will then increase.
Unlike in Ma (1994), a positive eﬀect of output-based ﬁnancing on the
level of quality can occur in our model even in the absence of a positive
demand response. This can be seen from Eq.(7) by realising that an increase
in φ will raise the income level I and hence stimulate to increased labour
supply even if ∂n/∂ˆ e =0 . A higher level of income will increase labour supply
because it becomes more important to avoid sanctions due to illegitimate
absenteeism. For the same reason, even an increase in the ﬁxed salary w may
lead to increased eﬀort and higher quality of health services in a situation
18with both health worker shortage and absenteeism.
Higher income will not inﬂuence labour supply if there are no eﬀec-
tive mechanisms for monitoring and sanctioning illegitimate absenteeism.
Without such mechanisms, a change in labour supply will not have any im-
pact on expected incomes (the probability π would be unaﬀected by l, i.e.,
∂π/∂l =0 ) . One way of formalising how the probability π might depend





β mi f l < β
1 if l ≥ β
Here, β can be interpreted as the number of working hours speciﬁed in the
employment contract. π is equal to one as long as the health worker is present
at work as much as she is supposed to (l ≥ β) .H o w e v e r ,i fh e rl a b o u rs u p p l y
falls below β, there is a probability of some kind of sanctions (π<1) insofar
as the level of absenteeism is monitored (i.e., m>0).
In this case, a higher level of monitoring of absenteeism may have a
positive impact not only on labour supply but also on the level of eﬀort and
the quality of health services. This follows straightforwardly from Eq. (7)
and the fact that a higher level of monitoring will make it more proﬁtable











> 0 if l < β
In summary, the main message from this discussion is that in the case of
a health worker shortage, all kinds of incentives which stimulate to increased
labour supply will contribute to increased quality of health services. Hence,
the number of policy instruments that can be used in order to improve service
quality will be much larger than in the case of abundant labour supply.
The mechanisms for improving quality discussed in this section will of
course only have an eﬀe c tt ot h ee x t e n tt h a th e a l t hw o r k e r sa r em o t i v a t e db y
monetary incentives. In our model, there is no diﬀerence between the selﬁsh
and the ethical health worker in this respect. Both types of workers respond
in qualitatively the same way to a strengthening of monetary incentives and
the level of monitoring. In reality, there are diﬀerences among workers with
regards to how sensitive their choices are to monetary rewards.
We started this section by claiming that to link monetary incentives to
19the level of quality or eﬀort is not feasible due to the prohibitive costs of
monitoring and supervision. This, of course, does not imply that supervision
of quality or eﬀort cannot aﬀect the level of performance. But in our opinion
such monitoring and supervision can only have a signiﬁcant impact if they
contribute to increased knowledge and skills, or to changes in the underlying
motivations of the health workers, whi c hi st h ei s s u et h a tw en o wt u r nt o .
3.3 Professionalism and organisational identity
We have presented two diﬀerent ways in which health workers may be moti-
vated by factors beyond their narrow self-interest. These alternative motiva-
tions represent separate channels through which policy makers may seek to
inﬂuence the health workers’ provision of high quality health services.
There is a strong tradition for promoting professional standards of con-
duct in the health sector. By communicating these standards to the health
workforce, health workers may adopt them as part of their own personal mo-
tivations, in the sense that their utility depends on the degree to which they
are able to fulﬁll the professional standards. As professional attitudes in the
health sector are very much geared towards providing services of adequate
quality, a natural ﬁrst guess is that a strengthening of health workers’ pro-
fessionalism will improve the quality of health services. We show, however,
that this guess may be wrong.
In our model, there are two diﬀerent ways of strengthening professional
standards. First, one can increase the level of γ, which is the degree to
which health workers experience a utility loss by deviating from the standard.
Second, one may tighten the standard itself by raising the level of qN.
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of increasing γ. It follows straightforwardly from
Eq. (9) that in case of a health worker shortage, a higher γ will increase









− 1) < 1
It is not obvious that this inequality holds. If the demand response (εn,q)
is large and the actual quality of health services (q) falls considerably short of
20the professional standard (qN), an increase in γ may in fact reduce the quality
of health services. On the one hand, a higher γ implies that health workers
have stronger incentives to improve the level of quality, but on the other hand,
higher γ also implies a higher utility loss of treating an even larger number
of patients with sub-standard quality. We believe this to be an important
observation: Professionalism is not necessarily a quality-driving motivation
if it is diﬃcult for the workers to live up to the professional standard.
In our model, lifting the professional standard to higher levels would in
itself have an unambiguously negative impact on quality. As seen from Eq.
(9), a higher qN will reduce the marginal beneﬁts of increasing labour supply
(and eﬀorts). This is simply because lifting the professional standard only
contributes to a larger utility loss per patient for those health workers who
are concerned about reaching the standard.5
A strengthening of the health workers’ organisational identity, modelled
here as a concern for the aggregate health services (nq) provided, have an un-
ambiguously positive eﬀect on labour supply and on the level of eﬀort/quality
when there is a health worker shortage. This follows straightforwardly from
t h ef a c tt h a tah i g h e rl e v e lo fα increases the marginal beneﬁto fl a b o u r
supply (and eﬀorts) (see Eq. (9)). This is not a surprising result, but it is
nevertheless an important observation. First, it stands as an interesting con-
trast to the ambiguous eﬀect on the quality of health care of strengthening
the degree of professionalism. Second, it provides a useful background for
interpreting patterns in empirical data on the level of eﬀort and its correlates.
For instance, Das and Hammer (2007) observe a positive correlation between
eﬀort and the level of provider skills. In their model, which only considers
selﬁsh health workers, this observation is interpreted as evidence that there
are complementarities between skills and eﬀort. This would also be a possible
explanation within our model, but other interpretations also become visible
once we include the possibility that health workers may have other-regarding
preferences. For instance, a high degree of organisational identity (or altru-
ism) might cause both a high level of eﬀort and a high level of skill, as we
would expect more altruistic people to work harder in the medical schools.
How can policy makers strengthen the organisational identity of health
workers? There is no simple formulae they can apply, and a comprehensive
5If the utility loss of a professional health worker were a convex function of the diﬀerence
between actual quality and the quality standard (e.g., −n(qN − q)2), there would also be
an eﬀect drawing towards higher q when qN increases, as and increase in (qN − q) would
increase the marginal utility gain of improving the level of quality.
21answer is beyond the scope of this article. The literature dealing with these
issues regularly refers to respect, recognition and participation as important
motivators.6 In order to enhance the employees’ organisational identity or
self-motivation, workers must be paid respect and not be used simply as
means to further the interests of the owners. Self-motivation can also be fos-
tered if owners and/or managers recognise and communicate the importance
of the work that is done. Yet another way of strengthening organisational
identity may be to include the workers in setting performance targets at their
work site.
A distinctive feature of the health sector is that many workers enter with
a strong motivation to serve the patients. The job for health sector managers
is then to maintain this motivation, which probably also requires them to
show respect, express interest in and recognise the work that is done, and
invite workers to participate in the setting of performance standards. One
aspect of paying respect to the workers is to provide a decent remuneration.
This issue is particularly relevant in low income countries, where real wages
of public sector workers in may places have been declining for years after
years. It is also likely that providing health workers with adequate means
to do their job can signify respect and recognition and thus cultivate their
care for patients. In our model, this would imply that α -t h ew e i g h tt h a t
health workers assign to patient care - may be a positive function of the
salary w and of the performance enabling factors x, at least over some range.
Supervision may play a similar role, insofar as the supervision is performed
in a supportive manner which recognises the importance of the work done
and involves the health workers in deﬁning performance standards.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper provides an analytical framework for assessing policies for increas-
ing the quality of health services when health workers are in short supply. In
our set-up, a health worker shortage im p l i e st h a tn u r s e sa n dd o c t o r sw o r k
longer hours and spend less time per patient than they would have done with
more health workers around. Using this constrained optimum as our baseline
produces many interesting insights into how the quality of health care can be
6Consult Pfeﬀer (2007), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007) and Akerlof and Kranton
(2005) for a general discussion of organisational identity and worker performance.
22improved, especially when we include the other-regarding motivations that
often seem to drive health worker behaviour.
One possible extension of our work would be to move beyond the sin-
gle (representative) health worker and study the interaction among several
workers. One interesting issue is how the labour supply (and eﬀort) chosen
by one health worker would aﬀect the labour supply of other health workers
at the same facility. If one health worker reduces his labour supply at the
clinic, there will be more patients for his colleagues. They will then have to
increase their working time and/or reduce their time per patient in order to
attend to all patients. The quality of the services is likely to fall. We have
shown that if quality falls suﬃciently below a certain standard, professional
health workers may reduce their labour supply. This indicates the possibility
of a dynamic process with negative feedbacks which can bring a clinic to an
equilibrium with very low labour supply and low quality of health services.
Another possible extension is to include the choice of entering the health
workforce. Our model provides an analytical grip on the intuitive idea that
when there is a shortage of health workers, there are positive externalities
in the recruitment of additional workers. In our analysis, the shortage of
health workers makes the existing workers choose a diﬀerent labour supply
and work eﬀort than in the unconstrained case. Hence, their utility from
work would increase if they had fewer patients, as would be the case if more
health workers were employed. This positive externality implies that policy
makers ought to follow a ”big push” strategy in order to ﬁll vacancies in the
health sector.
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